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er Anyonewho has followed this book so far would expect to find in this last
er chaptera quantification of the impact of changes in Colombian trade policies
on that economy's various development targets in the areas of efficiency,
• growth, employment, income distribution, stability, and national autonomy.
The direction of expected changes in the various magnitudes would not be
enough; ideally something should also be said about the likely magnitude of
the different effects.
No such scientific and credible quantification will be presented here. Two 4
interrelatedtypes of difficulties stand in the way. As for most countries, no
simple positive trade theory appears to explain accurately the evolving
Colombian trade structure. An inelegant and qualitative eclectic appeal to
elements of positive theories of location, "vent-for-surplus," Heckscher-
Ohlin, and the product cycle is the best that can be done to explain Colombian
of trade patterns both with industrialized countries and with other developing
countries, particularly those in Latin America. While these positive theories
12 oftrade agree on the misty proposition that liberalized trade policies could and
are likely to improve the efficiency (and perhaps growth) of a country without
ce
monopolypower in international markets, their predictions regarding income
an distributionand employment effects of trade liberalization are even mistier,
ed especiallywhen they are applied to a world that contains more than two goods
he andtwo factors.
• Afairly disaggregated quantitative model of the Colombian economy,
• something which as yet does not exist, could simulate responses to trade
policy changes. In this chapter, the kind of information ideally desired will be
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listed, and available data will be reviewed. Rough order-of-magnitude esti-
mates of possible effects of trade policies will be made whenever possible. E
In Chapter 7 it was shown how after the November 1966 collapse of the
ambitious import liberalization program launched in September 1965 a more tc
modest and gradual liberalization process could be said to have started in
March 1967. Thus, a review of major economic trends from 1967 through 1973 C
will be presented first. Then we shall speculate on possible effects of further gi
liberalization on efficiency, growth, income distribution, employment, stabil- di
ity, and national autonomy.
tI•
w
THE RECORD FOR 1967-73
2:
Foreign trade statistics, other partial data, and national accounts, the latter
available only through 1972, show a notable change for the better between T
1956—67 and 1967—73. But as can be seen in Table i-i, a good share of that W
contrast can be explained by the difference in behavior of the key exogenous Si
variable,the dollar coffee price, which after falling at a rate of more than 3 per ti
cent per year from 1956 through 1967, rose by more than 6 per cent per year
1
from 1967 through 1972.' h
Nevertheless, a comparison of trade data for 1948—56 with those for Y
1967—72 confirms what is known from previous chapters: the improved perfor- IS
mance of recent years is not simply due to exogenous factors. The rise in c
coffee prices during 1967—72 has been smaller than during 1948—56, while the d
expansion of registered minor exports has been larger. While in the earlier d
years the share of minor exports tended to fall, it rose significantly during C
1967—72. Furthermore, contrary to what would be expected for magnitudes S
that start from a small base, the growth rate of minor exports rose between C
1956—67 and 1967—72. Undoubtedly, many nontraditional exports benefited
from unusually high world prices, particularly during 1972—73, but in most
cases such exports had initially responded to inducements originating in
domestic policy, which stimulated activities that could so benefit.
The growth rate of real GDP has averaged more than 6 per cent per year
from 1967 through 1973, a figure somewhat higher than that for 1948_56,2 and
sharply better, especially in per capita terms, than the average 4.6 per cent
registered for 1956—67. All major GDP components listed in Table 1-2 show
increases in their growth rate between 1956—67 and 1967—72, and all stand
above their respective averages for the whole period from 1950 through 1972.
C
At least for the level of aggregation shown, it does not appear that the higher Si
post-1967 growth is the result of pulling resources outofthe least productive tr
(measured) activities and putting them into more productive ones; the growth C
proffle thus has a "vent-for-surplus" flavor.3 It may also be observed that the PTHERECORD FOR 1967—73 217
post-1967 expansion has a more balanced profile than that for 1950—56.
11 Especially to be noted in Table 1-2 are the lower growth rate for construction
h
and the higher one for primary production. (Construction, however, appears
e to have boomed during 1973 and early 1974.)
re One way to investigate whether a significant change in the pattern of
11 Colombian growth has occurred since 1967 is to examine how well average
growth rates since World War II fit the post-1967 experience. This has been er done for the output of major activities in agriculture, livestock, and manufac-
'1
- turing,as given in the national accounts, which are available from 1950
through 1972. Each of the output indices (y) for these activities has been fitted
with the following regression: log y =a+ bt1 + ct2.
As before, t1 denotes a time trend variable going from 1 (for 1950) through
23 (for 1972). The variable t2 takes values of zero for 1950 through 1966 and
•er values of 18, 19 22, 23 for the six years included from 1967 through 1972.
en The b coefficient will then yield a hypothesized "normal" growth rate for the
•iat whole period; the c coefficient will give deviations during 1967—72 modifying
such a trend. A plot on a semilogarithmic grid of the logarithm of y against
er time shows a kink and a change of slope after 1966, with both pre- and post-
- 1966 trends represented as straight lines joining in 1966. If the coefficient c
happens to be zero, the graph will show the usual straight line, whose slope
for yields the single average growth rate. In what follows, when the coefficient c
is twice its standard error or more, it will be deemed significant, which of
in course does not imply necessarily that it is large. The positive or negative
he deviations can be due to a variety of causes, including policy changes not
ier directly related to the trade and payments system (and to changes in the
ng coverage of national accounts data!). It could also be argued that lack of a
es significant deviation from trend may result from conflicting influences that
en cancel each other out. But since a complete model of the Colombian economy
ed is lacking, an obvious first step seems to be to examine the clearest departures
)st from trend, speculating later as to their meaning.
in The results of this exercise are presented in tables 8-1 and 8-2. As noted
earlier, in recent years there has been a slight pickup in the mediocre growth
rate for agriculture and livestock. In Table 8-1, significantly positive 1967—72
nd deviations from trend appear in garlic and onions, rice, potatoes, plantains,
mandioc, horses (!), and "other," both in agriculture and livestock. In the
Colombian context this whole group may be characterized as involving pre-
-nd dominantly nontradable goods. Major export crops apart from coffee, such as
72. cotton, bananas, cocoa, sugar cane, tobacco, and bovine cattle fail to show
significant accelerations in their growth rates during 1967—72. However, the
ive trend growth rates are impressive ones, particularly those for cotton, sugar
•vth cane, and bovine cattle. On the whole, it would be difficult to attribute the
the pickup in the agriculture and livestock growth rate after 1967 to further stimuli218 TRADEPOLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 8-1
Agriculture and Livestock: Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Output for
1950—72 and Growth Rate Deviations During 1967—72


























Copraa 11.42 —1.81 at
(2.29) (1.72)








Tobacco 4.31 _1.25* (I
(0.73) (0.54) P1
Wheat —0.67 _2.46*











All livestock 3.68 0.18
(0.25) (0.18)










Other livestock products 3.55
(0.23) (0.17)
SOURCE: Basic data from BdIR-CN.
*Coefficient for the deviation from trend is twice its standard error or more.
a. Through 1971 only.
arising from the trade policies followed since that year. At best it could be
argued that those policies helped sustain continued diversification away from
coffee and impressive growth rates in several export-oriented rural activities
that otherwise might have been slowed down in their performance, as in the
case of some oilseeds of which production had been oriented primarily toward
import substitution. Preliminary data for 1973 show that output growth for
agriculture and livestock as a whole has remained somewhat above the whole
postwar trend, but no sharp break in trend is apparent.
The manufacturing pattern, presented in Table 8-2, is even more difficult
to characterize simply. First of all, while in Table 1-2 an increase is shown in
the manufacturing growth rate for 1967—72, in contrast with that for the whole
period, in Table 8-2, a slowdown is recorded in the 1967—72 growth rate for
"modern" manufacturing. The sensitivity of the results to use of the
depressed year 1967 as a base (as well as to the relatively slow recovery inTABLE 8-2
Manufacturing:Average Annual Percentage Growth Rates of Output for 1950—72 and
Growth Rate Deviations During 1967—72 19
(standard errors in parentheses) trt
fat
Trend Growth ab
Rate, Deviation from OC
1950—72 Trend, 1967—72 of
All manufacturing 6.23 —0.12 in
(0.12) (0.09)
Industrial manufacturing 7.03 _0.23* a
(0.15) (0.11) ca
Small-scale industry and handicrafts 3.26 0.09* A
(0.03) (0.02) WI,
Food processing 5.98 0.89* an
(0.27) (0.20) fu
Beverages 4.57 0.21 fa
(0.26) (0.19) 19




Shoes and clothing 8.28 —0.15 p
(0.20) (0.15) ar
Wood products and furniture 4.80 —1.10* 01
(0.52) (0.38) m1
Paper products 10.94 0.39 re!
(0.32) (0.23)
Printing and publishing 7.95 —0.65
(0.48) (0.35) a
Leather processing 4.46 0.03 g
(0.29) (0.21)
Rubber products 8.72 _1.40* s
(0.68) (0.50)
Chemical products 8.33 _0.70*
G
(0.30) (0.22)
Petroleum and coal derivatives 9.57 —I
a
(0.48) (0.35)
Nonmetallic mineral products 6.32 9.
(0.34) (0.25) 9.
Basicmetal products 20.78 _5.67*
(2.38) (1.74)
Mechanical and metallurgical products 14.65 _2.60* in
(0.43) (0.32) to
Souace: Same as for Table 8-1.
*Coefficient for the deviation from trend is twice its standard error or more.THE RECORD FOR 1967—73 221
and 1968) suggests that no great weight can be attached to the apparent change in
trend. Furthermore, preliminary data for 1973 indicate above-average ruanu-
facturing growth rates. On the whole, once longer time series become avail-
able, it will probably not be possible to establish that a significant break
f occurred in the manufacturing growth rate in about 1967, using the technique
'67—72 of Table 8-2.
That table also shows a complex pattern of acceleration and deceleration
2 in growth rates for manufacturing branches. Counting small-scale industry and
)9) handicrafts as a branch, significant declines appear for eight branches, signifi-
cant increases for three, and no significant changes show up in five branches.
Ii) Among the eight activities with declining growth rates, several are associated
with strong import-substituting efforts, including rubber products, chemicals,
and basic metal products; but others, such as textiles, wood products, and
:0) furniture, are increasingly linked to manufactured exports. The three manu-
facturing industries with significant acceleration in their growth rates during
•.9) 1967—72 are also a mixed bag: small-scale industry and handicrafts, food
processing, and tobacco processing. The three sell overwhelmingly to the
9) domestic market, but presumably have sharply different requirements for
unskilled and skilled labor and capital. Some indirect information on the latter
point is given in Table 8-3. Unfortunately, the categories in tables 8-2 and 8-3
are not exactly alike, and neither source provides information on recent shares
of output exported. Nevertheless, from the figures in column I of Table 8-3 it
8) may be assumed that activities such as tobacco and food processing have
9 requirements for human and physical capital per unit of output which were not
3) below the manufacturing average.4
Application of the technique used in tables 8-1 and 8-2 to the more
5) aggregatednational accounts indicates significant post-1967 acceleration in
3 growth rates only for primary production (in spite of deceleration in mining,
1) mainly petroleum), construction, and what is called in Table 1-2 Type-Il
0* services. Construction and services, of course, have a very small degree of
0) "tradability." Thus viewed, the post-1967 acceleration in the growth rate of
GDP could hardly be said to rest on a reallocation of resources, neither
3* absolute nor relative, from nontradable goods and services into tradable ones.
On the whole, it is difficult to detect a powerful and unambiguous impact
8* of post-1967 trade policies on the 1967—72 growth pattern. But besides the
5) problem of untangling the effects of new trade policies from those of other
-7* policies and variables, the 1967—72 period is perhaps too short to allow for
4) structural changes. During that period, for example, the performance of
0* individual manufacturing activities was in many cases more influenced by the
•2) long-run import-substitution cycle than by the new export promotion policies,
but such a situation, which can be seen in the residuals of several of the trend
regressions, could change in the future.
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The good 1967—73 growth performance may be best explained by the
7
following mechanism. Higher growth rates in foreign-exchange receipts, pri- B
manly derived from merchandise exports, allowed the government systemati-
cally to follow more expansionary fiscal and monetary policies than had been ti
possible during 1956—67.Suchstimuli, and the positive reactions they trig-
gered in private expenditure, led to a higher level of resource utilization
almost acrossthe board withinthe Colombian economy. Widespread pockets
of underutilized labor, capital, and land were gradually brought into produc-
tion without any major sector being required to contract so as to release
resources for better use elsewhere. The foreign-exchange scarcity of 1956—67
forced fiscal and monetary policies sporadically to apply severe limits on
aggregate demand; these restrictions were clumsy in the sense that nearly all tr
sectors suffered, whether or not they were heavy users of foreign exchange. d
If this interpretation is correct, recent growth should have been not only
higher but also more stable than before 1967. In the following tabulation, e
simple year-to-year growth rates were taken for 1968—72 and for the previous
1
five years (1963—67), and the means of absolutedeviationsfrom average
growth rates for both periods were compared.
E
1963—67 1968—72 c
GDPat constant market prices:
Average growth rate 4.52% 6.28%
Average absolute deviation 0.99 0.38
Real domestic gross capital formation:
Average growth rate 3.09 9.37
tI
Average absolute deviation 10.80 7.37 C
Dollar merchandise imports, c.i.f.: C
Average growth rate 1.85 11.46
Average absolute deviation 24.34 8.07 e
U
Deviationsaround the average growth rate were smaller from 1968 h
through 1972 not only relative to average growth but also in absolute amounts.
A more plentiful supply of foreign exchange since 1967 made possible the ri
elimination of erratic stop-go policies, improving both the growth rate and u
domestic stability.
The process of bringing into production resources left idle by past stop-go
policies has clear limits. Some types of land and of relatively unskilled labor
may remain in "surplus" even after the 1967—73 expansion, although it is
doubtful that supply is perfectly elastic even in their case. The "venting" of
those resources with low opportunity costs via exports will remain a key I
ingredientfor a successful growth policy, but domestic expansion will be
sustained by fewer pockets of other underutilized resources than during 1967—
73. Investment rates, which did not change much between 1963—67 and 1968— e
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72, will probably have to increase merely to maintain the recent growth rates.
But more on this in the section dealing with trade policies and future growth.
The quality of the available data on 1967—73 changes in income distribu-
tion, employment, and degree of foreign ownership and control is poorer than
g- the data I used for the output indices. In spite of this limitation, in the rest of
the chapter, an attempt will be made to answer the question, What can we
ts expect, viewing the matter during 1974, from further Colombian trade and
c- exchange liberalization? This will involve reviewing (and some guessing) as to
se what has actually been happening to key variables during 1967—73. Guessing
will also be necessary regarding the future trend of world prices for Colombian
staples. if the world prices reached by coffee, cotton, sugar, and all other
ill tradables in 1973 are sustained, the case for further real effective peso
devaluations would become quite doubtful, and the ideal liberalization policy
ly (as well as its urgency) would be different from that which would result if it is
expected that prices of coffee (and other staples) will collapse as they did in
•is 1956—57.
EVIDENCE ON STATIC EFFICIENCY EFFECTS
OF COLOMBIAN TRADE POLICIES: REVIEW
AND OUTLOOK
Colombian postwar trade and exchange policies induced static inefficiencies in
the sense that some of the foreign exchange saved by import substitution
could have been obtained more cheaply, i.e., at lower domestic resource
costs, by using in export activities Colombian resources that have low oppor-
tunity costs, primarily natural resources of various kinds, and to a lesser
extent, unskilled labor. This formulation does not imply that resources not
used in those export activities but which "could have been" used, or could
58 have been developed much earlier than they in fact were, found their way into
5. the import-substituting sector. In the Colombian case it is more accurate to
regard a good share of these low-opportunity-cost resources as remaining
untapped, as with natural resources, or blending into a murky nontradable or
"informal" sector. The blocking effect of trade and exchange policies in the
vent-for-surplus process will be discussed in the next section, on the assump-
Dr tion that foreign nonpreferential demand for many actual and potential nontra-
-is ditional Colombian exports is high. Such a key assumption is also made in this
of section, which will focus on prima facie evidence of static inefficiencies.
In earlier chapters, documentation was provided for the assumption that
•e during the postwar period world demand for Colombia's actual and potential
• nontraditionalexports was highly price-elastic. Such a statement is of course
easier to make cx post than ex ante. The process of finding new foreign226 TRADE POLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
markets is much more complex than is implied by the small-country assump-
tion, and itis surrounded by considerable uncertainty both for individual
export products and for the whole export drive. Nevertheless, on balance it
appears that excessive elasticity pessimism dominated Colombian policy after
the Second World War.
As a result, postwar public policy offered, on the whole, greater encour- —
agementto import substitution than to exporting activities. Detailed studies on
the exact incidence of such incentives are few, and available only for the more
recent years. The most complete is a study carried out by Thomas L.
Hutcheson,5 who used various assumptions and methodologies to calculate
F
effective rates of protection in 1969 for several manufacturing and primary
activities. In that study, he relied on comparisons between Colombian and 1
foreign prices for his calculations; his data came predominantly from Colom- 1
bian producers and consisted of comparisons of their domestic price with their S
export price.6 C
Some of Hutcheson's major results are presented in Table 8-4. Taking as
a yardstick an exchange rate 34 per cent higher than that observed during F'
1969, Hutcheson argues that any activity listed in Table 8-4 that received less
than 34 per cent in effective protection was relatively disfavored, while those i
receivingmore were protected. The 34 per cent devaluation involves a
( "guesstimate" about the adjustment which would have been necessary to
maintain external balance if the protective structure had been removed.
The theoretical and empirical difficulties in this type of calculation are
well known. Nevertheless, a major robust conclusion emerges from Hutche-
son's results, based on the large variance observed in the protection received
by different sectors in 1969. Thus, the generalization that, on average, manu-
facturing is protected while primary production is not can be supplemented
with the generalization that protection varies considerably from industry to
industry, Indeed, if comparable data were available, they would almost
certainly show that net protection also varies sharply according to size of firm
or farm.
Tariffs, import controls, export subsidies, and exchange rates are only
part of the state's arsenal of policy instruments. Tax and credit incentives or
direct official participation can be of greater importance for some projects.
Furthermore, the exact incidence of the whole array of policy instruments can
change from year to year, depending on such things as the actual and expected
relative price structure being signaled to Colombia from world markets in a
given year. Nevertheless, Hutcheson argues that his measures of effective
protection are significantly and positively related to growth rates of different
11
industries in the manufacturing sector.7 He concludes that protection, particu- r
larly as measured by the Balassa method, made a difference in the pattern of 0
growth within manufacturing. He argues that the structure of protection has
contributed to slow economic growth and increasing unemployment. Propos-
Ii
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TABLE8-4
Ia! Effective Rates of Protection by Groups of Traded Sectors, 1969
it (per cent)
er
Balassa Method Corden Method
Coffee —45 —45
Mining —8 —6
re Sugar —23 —19
L. Primary except coffee and mining 0 1
'ite Food products except sugar 2 11
.ry Beverages 121 103




as Wood products —11 1
ng Furniture —25 —11
Paper products 12 14
Leatherproducts 11 16
se Rubber products —31 —26
a Chemical products 61 56
to Refinery products —5 4
NonmetalLicmineral products —8 0
Lre Basic metals 151 39
Metal manufacture 47 43
Nonelectrical machinery —7 12
u- Electrical apparatus a 668
Transportequipment 610 319
to Diverse industries 117 89
All manufacturing 44 29
m All manufacturingexcept tobacco and
beverages 40 25
All manufacturing except sugar 50 33
Primaryexportsexcept coffee and mining 18 18
or Manufactured exports except sugar 21 21
'S.
in SOURCE: Adaptedfrom ThomasL. Hutcheson, "Incentives for Industrialization in Colom-
bia" (Ph.D.diss., University of Michigan, 1973), Table 3.5, p.68.
a.Valueaddedisnegative.
a
nt ing a policy of uniform protection, he expects that there would be much
reshuffling within each sector as specialization occurred, but few cases of
of outright disappearance of sectors.
as Comparison of a few new export activities with some import-substituting
Is- industries as they stood in about 1971 also reveals large differences in domes-228 TRADE POLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
tic resource costs (DRCs) between the two groups, on the order of two to one.
For example, while exporters of carnations and of some leather products had
respective DRCs of 18 and 17 pesos per dollar received, a firm producing
specialized textile products and benefiting from prohibitions against competi-
tion from imports had DRCs of 36 pesos per dollar.8 These examples serve a
useful pedagogical purpose, but more needs to be said about the prevalence of
extremes in DRCs among Colombian sectors producing tradable commodities.
-Although the extraordinary expansion of nontraditional exports during
1967—74 was aided by favorable world economic conditions, it has demon-
strated that a large number of varied Colombian activities have DRCs no higher
than about the exchange rate plus the CAT. By 1973, minor exports had
reached between 5 and 6 per cent of GNP, and that placed an upper limit
on those lowest-DRC activities. Given an annual growth rate in the dollar
value of these exports of about 15 per cent, it is difficult to imagine scenarios
for which the share of minor exports in GNP could have been much higher
than that achieved. The static assumption of almost perfectly elastic world
demand for Colombian minor exports implies that much higher shares (even 100
per cent?) of Colombian resources could have been directed into low-DRC
minor exports "quickly." However, it can be argued that once uncertainty,
costs of obtaining information about foreign markets, and high marginal costs
for abrupt changes in production plans are taken into account, it becomes
questionable whether expansion rates for minor exports higher than those ob-
served are feasible (or even optimal). By 1970, in fact, minor exports had
reached levels close to those foreseen in 1962 by observers who assumed that
Colombia would follow "correct" policies during
At the other extreme, the manufacturing activities found by Hutcheson to
have the highest effective rates of protection, say 40 per cent and above,
account for about one-third of value added in manufacturing at domestic
prices, or between 6 and 7 per cent of GNP. A more precise identification of
the "horror stories" of import substitution can be given. Prime candidates
include the automobile industry, which received government impetus during
the late 1960s; petrochemicals and some other chemicals, particularly pharma-
ceuticals; electrical appliances, such as refrigerators and washing machines;
artificial fibers; and some alcoholic beverages, particularly whiskey. Such
sectors represent somewhat less than a third of manufacturing value added;
what is remarkable is how much of Colombian manufacturing operates near
world prices.
On the other hand, as emphasized by Francisco Thoumi, the share of
manufacturing investment captured during the last fifteen years by the horror-
story industries is an impressive one. It is estimated that between 1962 and
1967 gross investments in petroleum derivatives, including petrochemicals,
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e. reports that over $100 million was invested in petrochemicals in Colombia in
the 1960s, and another $120 million was scheduled to be invested during the
1970s.1' Such projects have also taken up an important share of the limited
ii- pool of highly skilled professionals and workers. One should note, however,
a that sensible cost- and employment-conscious criticisms of petrochemical
of investments have been made to look less than farsighted because of the
s. unusual events occurring in world markets during 1973—74. However,
substantial direct and indirect commitments to the automobile industry have
not yet found a redeeming historical accident.'2
er It may be added that the participation of direct foreign investment in
many of the horror-story industries, such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals,
ut and artificial fibers, is large. The horror in those stories involves not just high
ar real costs due to low production runs, unsuitable factor combinations, and
other standard reasons, but also untaxed quasi rents or excess profits earned
er by foreigners, and made possible by the protective system. On its own and in
Id partnership with foreign or local investors, the public Institute of Industrial
Development (IFI, Instituto de Fomento Industrial) has also involved its long-
term credit facilities in several ill-starred import-substitution schemes, includ-
ing Forjas de Colombia, making foundry products and rolling equipment, and
ts COLCARR1L, producing railroad cars. IFI participated with Renault in
the expansion of the automotive industry, and with public Venezuelan capital
b- in the creation of a large plant for producing caprolactam, a sophisticated
petrochemical (Monómeros Colombo-Venezolanos).
at The gradual lifting of import restrictions which has taken place since
1967, and which accelerated during 1973 and early 1974 under the pressure of
:o bulging foreign-exchange reserves and extraordinary domestic inflation, has
probably removed static inefficiencies involved in excessive precautionary as
Ic well as speculative holdings of inventories of importable goods. Such invento-
ries usually involve spare parts, intermediate products, and raw materials, but
could also include installed but unused imported machinery and equipment.
g Interviews with businessmen during 1971 indicated that uncertainties about
access to imports led them to carry stocks they regarded as excessive corn-
pared with those of, say, Venezuelan businessmen. Musalem'3 has shown that
h the early stages of import liberalization programs were accompanied by a rush
to build up inventories of importable goods, in the expectation that such
ir liberalization efforts would be reversed. So both the level and the fluctuations
in inventories were in all likelihood influenced by the import control system,
especially before 1967, in a manner conducive to inefficiencies.
A strong a priori case can be made for linking LDC import-licensing
d policies to generalized excess capacity in industry. But in Colombia such a
link appears weak. Thoumi, who did major research on the utilization of fixed
Z industrial capital in Colombia, concluded14 that capacity utilization in recent230 TRADE POLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
years had been relatively high compared with that in the few other countries dc
for which there is any information. Hours of capacity use are related to long- ar
run structural variables, including management quality, which are influenced
by trade policy only indirectly. Stop-go cycles related to the foreign-exchange
bottleneck have influenced capacity utilization, particularly during 1956—67, ot
and excess capacity in the horror-story industries can also be found, but no
strong general link appears to exist between import licensing as practiced in
Colombia and excess capacity. The protective system can, of course, be th
blamed for excess capacity in the most misguided import-substitution proj- e
ects, whether because one plant was built with full knowledge that the st
domestic market could not absorb its full output for many years (and export
markets could not be found), or because the combination of extravagant
protection and easy entry led to industrial organizations characterized by
monopolistic competition, with many plants working at far less than full sc
capacity, as in washing machines and automobiles. It may be noted that "easy
entry" was often the result of pressure from foreign interests. If a firm from
country X entered a juicy import-substituting industry, the embassy of coun- c
try Y would complain if its firms were not allowed to share in the spoils. b
Although some major import-substitution projects whose efficiency was e
far from obvious were launched after 1967, in the most recent years the a
reluctance of the public sector to support similar schemes has been growing.
Remember that such attitudes will be reflected not only in the tariff and the n
management of import controls but also, and often mainly, in the promises e
made or withheld regarding credit, taxes, and long-term public support. This a
new ambience in public development offices, including IF! and other public r
credit agencies, has perhaps been more important for what it has kept from
happening than for any tangible achievements. ul
if extravagant and massive new ventures into import substitution appear
on the decline, it remains true that the import control mechanism isstill
vigorously used for protecting existing (and some new) activities. Even with bj
foreign-exchange reserves reaching $600 million during the first quarter of hi
1974, import controls remained more restrictive than during January—October
1966. At the beginning of 1974 the free list still accounted for less than half of
reimbursable imports. The biases described in Chapter 6 remained, and under
the circumstances prevailing in early 1974, it was difficult to make a good
economic case for import controls as then administered. Their retention could
be justified only in special cases such as those involving dumping, health
hazards, and threats to public safety, for which tariffs may be insufficient.
Elimination of most import controls should bring about gains in efficiency and v
competitive pressures, and would probably improve access to imports for mcdi- S
urn and small businessmen and for those located outside Bogotti and Medellin. e
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es depression), accompanied by measures to be discussed below, should signal
an even firmer government commitment to expanding the export sector.
The maintenance of some forms of exchange control may be found
ge necessary, however, less for balance-of-payments reasons than to execute
other Colombian policies, such as vigilance over some kinds of capital flows,
particularly flows of direct foreign investment. Even for balance-of-pay-
in ments reasons standby controls can be justified in a country like Colombia
that isstill vulnerable to unexpected changes in a far from stable world
economy, and not so rich in policy tools that it can afford to throw away one
he still widely used in industrialized countries. Whether standby tools can be
)rt kept either from getting rusty or from being used by bureaucrats "because
they are there" is a moot question which I gladly refer to the wisdom of
by political scientists. It may also be noted that Colombian trade with nonmarket
ill socialist economies may require some types of trade and exchange control.
sy By signing the Cartagena Agreement creating the Andean Common
•rn Market, Colombia committed herself to a gradual loss of purely national
control over her tariffs. A common external Andean tariff is to be agreed upon
by 1976 and should be fully implemented by The common minimum
•'as external tariff agreed upon in December 1970, and toward which Colombia is
he already moving, is not very different from the one in effect in Colombia at the
ig. start, and could be described as on the whole lower and less varied than prior
he national tariffs. The hope has been expressed that the eventual common
es external tariff will be no higher on average than the minimum one, whose
us average is about 50 per cent. The outlook is not clear, but Colombia has been
tic reported as opposed to higher duties.
rn Ad hoc industrial complementation agreements among Andean countries,
under which temporary monopolies will be granted, could also involve Colom-
ar bia in intra-Andean import-substitution schemes. Some of these could have
ill the effect of rationalizing existing and mostly inefficient industries (e.g., steel),
th but not all of them would be desirable from an efficiency viewpoint. Progress
of has been slow in the negotiation of such agreements, which involve laborious
er and detailed parceling out of plants among countries. It is also reported that
of Colombia is on guard against the gestation, under these agreements, of white
er elephants of Andean dimensions.
By 1980, tariffs and controls over most commodity imports into Colombia
•Id from the Andean countries should be eliminated. The effect should be to
th generate some efficiency gains and a salutary competitive pressure on indus-
it. try. Contrary to a widespread misconception, there is room for trade creation
rid within the Andean group (see note 15). It could be argued that the political
•Ii- solidarity which may develop among the Andean nations could provide
••n. effective mechanisms for smoothing adjustment burdens generated by grow-
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done by trade with the rest of the world, which remains subject to sudden and
uncompensated shocks.
If import controls on trade are entirety eliminated and purely Colombian
management of import tariffs disappears, exchange-rate policy will become
even more important in keeping possible balance-of-payments pressures from
leading to inefficient trade policies. The point is reinforced because there is
growing recognition of the advisability of revamping the system of export
subsidies. As discussed in Chapter 2, the CAT scheme has contributed to the
expansion of minor exports, but it shows technical faults generating some
inefficiencies and has become increasingly expensive in terms of badly needed
tax revenues forgone. Its gradual elimination, compensated by a faster upward
crawl in the exchange rate, could leave exporters no worse off, on average,
than during early 1974 while providing more uniform incentives and increased
tax revenues.'6 It would be desirable to relax import controls, as dis-
cussed above, to help offset at least for the long run the upward pressures on
the domestic prices of importable goods that would be generated by the
proposed exchange-rate policies. Available information makes it difficult to be
precise on this point, however, providing a further reason to handle the whole
package in gradual steps, at the same time bringing under control the inflation-
ary pressures that existed during the first half of 1974. The gradual elimination
of both import controls and export subsidies may reduce frictions and quarrels
with both trade partners in the Andean region and those elsewhere.'7
Since the crawling peg system was adopted, in 1967, most observers
sympathetic to import liberalization have felt that the crawl was too slow,
citing as ultimate proof the continued need for licensing to repress imports and
CAT to stimulate minor exports. High and rising foreign-exchange reserves
during 1973 suggested that the degree of peso overvaluation may have been
substantially reduced, and it may even be questioned whether overvaluation
still exists. But the events of 1973 and early 1974 show the complications of
overvaluation calculations: much hinges on what is assumed about the future
of coffee and other commodity prices and about detailed elasticities in Colom-
bian trade with different geographical areas. The latter is necessary as the
peso followed the U.S. dollar after August 1971 and was therefore devalued
with respect to key nondollar currencies. Sustained inflation in industrialized
countries, of a type which may not be accurately reflected in wholesale price
indices, reduces confidence in purchasing-power-parity calculations such as
those presented in chapters 2 and 4. has to fall back on observation of the
trend in foreign-exchange reserves as import controls and the CAT are
gradually removed to verify the degree of present and future overvaluation. It
also remains to be seen whether the crawling peg will be as successful under
accelerating inflation as it was while Colombian inflation was diminishing in
the context of a relatively stable world price level.
A removal of export subsidies and import controls compensated for by
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nd exchange-rate adjustments will tend to reduce existing discrimination against
service exports, which include tourism and were never eligible for CATs, and
an in favor of service imports, on which no duties are paid and which have been
ne benefited by overvalued import exchange rates. Service imports include many
rn items that are doubtful candidates for subsidies, such as profit remittances,
travel, and remittances to middle- and upper-class children studying abroad.
rt Adoption of the policy package described above would complete the
he trend started in 1967, and put Colombia fully into the Bhagwati-Krueger Phase
ne V. The impact of such a step on GNP growth, say over the following ten
years, is again difficult to quantify. Note that now we are not taking as a base
rd of comparison the situation that characterized most of the period l956_67:19
rigid import controls and stop-go cycles, together with the prospect of further
ed massive import substitution. The question is, How much additional efficiency
•is. and growth would result from the suggested steps? Many of the once-and-for-
all gains that were to be reaped from post-1967 policies, such as fuller
•he utilization of existing capacity, have already been mostly captured. There
•be remain gains to be realized by a more efficient allocation of investment and
)le other resources, which could offset declines in the growth rate arising from the
n- exhaustion of pockets of resource underutilization. Much depends on how the
• rest of the world reacts to the expansion of new Colombian exports, and how
such a reaction limits possible gains from international specialization. Suppose
domestic policy and international circumstances allow resources now engaged
in the most inefficient import-substituting activities, amounting to (say) 7 per
cent of the GNP, to move toward new export activities during the next ten
ad years. Suppose further that domestic resource costs per dollar earned or saved
es are on average twice as much in the former as in the latter activity. Those
resources, once devoted to exporting, should generate a net gain of 7 per cent
)n of GNP, which may be taken as an upper estimate on potential static gains.
of It may be noted that given the conventions and practice of national
re accounting, some of the static gains may not even be reflected in GNP.
n- Switching a civil servant with a given salary from reviewing license applica-
tions to rural teaching will not affect GNP, at least for a long time. Psychic
gains and losses in dealing with or wielding bureaucratic power go unre-
corded. And so on. But even if possible unrecorded net gains are taken into
account, the elimination of import controls should not be expected to revolu-
as tionize either the efficiency, the growth, or the style of the Colombian
•ae economic system. Note that the comparison is not with an ideal textbook
re situation, but with what seems likely given world market realities limiting
It international specialization, and given Colombian political realities limiting the
er elimination of distortions benefiting one or another special interest. There is
in little point to supposing that the Colombian export share in GNP could reach
Puerto Rican or Hong Kong levels, or that the Colombian economic system
by could be freer of static distortions than those of Italy or Japan.I
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TRADE POLICIES, FOREIGN EXCHANGE
AVAILABILITY, AND GROWTH
In earlier chapters, 1 emphasized how balance-of-payments difficulties ham-
pered Colombian growth, particularly during 1956—67. As shown in Table 8-5,
gross investment in machinery and equipment, including transport, still relies
heavily on imports. During the late 1950s the new steel mill in Paz del RIo put a
dentin that imported share; the impact of the start of automotive production —
canalso be detected in 1971—72. Throughout, less dramatic and probably
more efficient light manufacturing industries have also helped to expand the
share of domestically produced machinery and equipment.
After the collapse of dollar coffee prices in the late 1950s, the constant-
price share of GNP devoted to gross investment in machinery and equipment
fell from an average of 12.6 per cent during 1950—56 to 7.7 per cent during
1957—69. Only during 1970—72 has that share risen in a sustained but unspec- —I
tacularmanner to an average of 8.3 per cent of GNP. While no detailed data
are available on investment allocation, it is known that in the 1950s consider-
able investment was made in social overhead capital and other projects quite
intensive in imported machinery and equipment; examples include the already
mentioned steel mill and the Atlantic railroad. Thus, the drop in the GNP
share devoted to gross investment in machinery and equipment reflects exoge-
nous changes in investment allocation as well as balance-of-payments strin-
gency.
It may be seen in Table 8-6 that investment in construction, its consider-
able year-to-year fluctuations smoothed in the table, behaved more stably than
machinery and equipment capital formation; its direct and indirect import
components are much lower than those of the latter category. Note that all the
percentages presented in Table 8-6 have been computed from data expressed
TABLE 8-5
Share of Imports in Gross Investment in Machinery and
Equipment Including Transport, 1950—54 to 1971—72
(underlying data in constant 1958 prices) t
Share Share
1950—54 93.7% 1963—66 76.2%
1955—56 93.6 1967—70 73.4
1957—58 84.8 1971—72 67.8
1959—62 82.7
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TABLE 8-6
TABLE 8-7
Financing of Gross Capital Formation, 1950—54 to 1971—72









1950-54 16.1 11.9 4.1 —
1955—56 18.2 12.0 4.5 1.7
1957—58 19.6 15.7 4.6 —0.7
1959—62 19.9 14.9 3.8 1.2
1963—66 18.8 12.6 3.4 2.8
1967—70 20.9 12.0 6.1 2.8
1971—72 22.1 12.4 5.1 4.6
SOURCE: BdIR-CN.
in constant 1958 prices. It is instructive to compare these figures with those in
Table 8-7, where capital formation and its financing are shown, as before, as
GNP shares, but with the underlying magnitudes in current prices. While
1950—56 investment ratios in Table 8-6 exceed those of later periods, in Table
8-7 the opposite is recorded.
At an accounting level, the discrepancy is mostly explained by the
evolution of the implicit prices of machinery and transport equipment relative
to the GNP deflator. As shown in Table 8-8, a remarkable rise in the relative
prices of these capital goods occurred after 1955—56; given Colombian depen-
Gross Capital Formation, 1950—54 to 1971—72

















1950—54 22.3 9.3 12.0 1.1
1955—56 25.7 10.9 14.2 0.6
1957—58 20.8 • 10.0 7.1 3.7
1959—62 20.2 9.8 8.3 2.1
1963—66 19.2 8.6 7.8 2.8
1967—70 19.3 10.3 7.3 1.6














1950—54 97.9 54.7 49.8 47.7
1955—56 96.0 51.8 50.3 48.1
1957—58 97.3 87.4 85.7 84.2
1959—62 110.8 81.9 89.7 85.0
1963—66 118.2 76.2 84.5 80.1
1967—70 117.0 92.6 101.2 101.6
1971—72 117.0 99.8 99.1 106.0
SOURCE: BdlR-CN. As suggested by the 1957—58 row, there was a sharp increase in the
relative prices for machinery and equipment between 1957 and 1958.
dence on imports of these goods, such a rise can readily be traced back to a
similar increase in the real import exchange rate, as can be seen by comparing
the last column of Table 8-8 with data in Table After peaking in 1958,
both relative prices fell, until new devaluations and the crawling peg brought
them back to about their 1958 levels during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The economic explanation for the sharp rise in the relative prices of
machinery and equipment during 1957 and 1958, and their high levels there-
after, is in the deterioration of the balance of payments, which was first
triggered by the collapse of dollar coffee prices. Such worsening of Colombian
terms of trade meant a loss in the effectiveness of the mechanism through
which the country transformed its savings into tangible machinery and equip-
ment. Coffee, at that time the indirect but major supplier of nonconstruction
capital goods, suffered an exogenous drop in dollar prices, equivalent to a
productivity loss in the machinery and equipment industry in a closed econ-
omy. A similar phenomenon has been recorded for another Latin American
country, Argentina, but for an earlier period.2' An increase in the real
exchange rate for imports as well as for nontraditional exports may thus be
viewed as a way of adjusting to the decline in efficiency of the traditional indirect
way of obtaining machinery and equipment, by rationing available foreign
exchange more stringently in the short run, and by encouraging recourse to
new direct and indirect sources of machinery and equipment in the long run.
While the real evolution of capital formation is best measured at constant
prices, the burdens involved in achieving a given savings rate should be
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TABLE 8-8
Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Investment, 1950—54 to 1971—72
1'
(dividedover implicit price deflator for GNP at market prices; 1958 100)
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measured at current prices, as in Table 8-7. In an aggregate, ex post sense, it
can be seen that the demand for all investment goods was shown to be
inelastic by the post-1956 increase in relative prices;22 a larger share of GNP
was saved domestically (except during 1963—66) after the rise in capital goods
relative prices than before. The paradoxical increase in national savings at a
time of severe balance-of-payments and growth crises during 1957—58 is
astonishing. It is noteworthy that national savings during the prosperous years
of 1971—72 stood at 17.5 per cent of GNP, substantially below the 20.3 per
cent rate achieved during the "blood, sweat, and tears" years of 1957 and
1958. Contrasting all of 1967—72 with 1950—56, the saving and capital inflow
rates emerge as follows:
1950—56 1967—72
Private savings 12.0% 12.1%
Public savings 4.2 5.8
Net capital inflow 0.4 3.4
e
Gross capital formation 16.7 21.3
Increases in the rates of public saving and capital inflow account for almost all
of the increase in the current-price rate of capital accumulation.
Even allowing for possible changes in the structure of investment alloca-
t tion, it would be difficult to credit the 1967—72 acceleration in GNP growth to a
higher rate of capital formation. Assuming a one-year average gestation period
f for investments, and comparing constant-price rates of gross capital formation
with GNP growth rates, the marginal capital-output ratio (MCOR) for 195 1—55
is 4.08; for 1956—67, 4.81; and for 1968—72, 3.22. The sharp drop in MCORs
between 1956—67 and 1968—72 contrasts with the more sluggish evolution of
the aggregate investment rate, which for 1950—54 is 22.3 per cent; for 1955—66,
20.9 per cent; and for 1967—71, 19.7 per cent.
Before 1968, there were not only severe restrictions on the importation of
capital goods, but also erratic stop-go fiscal and monetary policies, with
expansionary binges being followed by restrictive policies. Austerity in fiscal
and monetary matters, when applied, did help the balance of payments, but at
the cost of slowing GNP expansion and generating excess capacity even in
sectors where direct and indirect demand for imported inputs was small, such
t as construction. Excess capacity during 1956—67 was due not so much to a
lack of key imported inputs paralyzing whole factories, but to fiscal and
monetary policies which were not steadily expansionary because of fear—a
well-founded fear—that balance-of-payments problems would result. Selec-
t tive measures that would have allowed differential expansion depending on
import intensity were difficult to implement beyond gross aggregation levels.238 TRADE POLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
As the balance-of-payments situation improved after 1967, fiscal and
monetary policy (supported by the crawling peg) could avoid the violence of
previous stop-go spasms. But by 1972—73, further encouraged by booming
world demand, macro policies may have become overly expansionary, in the
sense that they could not be sustained. At any rate, since 1967 excess capacity
was steadily put to use, whether or not it relied on imported inputs. Thus, new
exports at one end tapped resources that had been less than fully used before,
in a vent-for-surplus fashion, while expansive aggregate domestic demand had
a similar effect on all nonexporting activities. Without the rising foreign-
exchange earnings,23 however, such a scenario would not have been possible.
In other words, given the exogenous dollar coffee price, the implicit 1956—67
"plan" not only contained static inefficiencies but was also internally incon-
sistent. A GNP growth rate of, say, 6 per cent per year required import values
greater than the exchange earnings arising from old and new exports. And
given Colombian parameters the required imports could not all be replaced by
domestic production within the required time span.
The higher andsteadierpost-1967 growth must have also encouraged an
investment process more efficient than that undertaken under the stop-go
gyrations of earlier years. How much this contributed to lowering the MCOR,
however, is a moot point.
It is likely that to sustain the GNP growth rates registered since 1967 the
constant-price investment coefficient, particularly that in machinery and
equipment, will have to continue its upward climb and at a faster rate. The
long-run benefit of breaking the foreign-exchange bottleneck, i.e., allowing a
larger inflow of imported capital goods and a higher investment rate, will then
become easier to identify than was the case during 1967—72, when the short-
run benefits described above predominated. Compared with earlier years,
Colombia now has a more diversified base for capital formation. Its indirect
sources of machinery and equipment, e.g., exports, as well as its own direct
output of those goods, look sturdier than in, say, 1956. A more general
diversification of the Colombian productive structure and, thus, a greater
capacity to transform, make policy tools potentially more effective in handling
possible exogenous shocks and in maintaining both balance-of-payments and
macroeconomic equilibrium. A higher rate of capital formation combined with
a more efficient allocation of investment should lead to changes in the Colom-
bian growth pattern less ambiguous than those noted earlier in this chapter for
1967—73.
In discussing the links between trade policies and growth in this section, I
dealt exclusively with variations on the foreign-exchange-gap model and with
short- and medium-term macroeconomic management, an approach which
some may find overly "Keynesian." While emphasizing the importance of
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possiblelinks between trade policies and other dynamic effects that influence
growth over the long run. But hard evidence on these matters is scanty.
Leonard Dudley,24 in a study of 25 import-substituting industries in the
Colombian metal products sector during 1959—66, found important learning
effects, explaining half of substantial productivity gains, particularly in cast-
ing, forging, and stamping. Whether or not import-substituting activities
generate larger learning effects than exporting ones, however, is a moot point.
There is anecdotal evidence showing that some firms (e.g., in textiles) are
remarkably X-efficient and innovative whether they devote themselves to
import substitution ortoexporting, as are Germans with alternative socioeco-
7 nomic systems. It will be recalled from Chapter 6 that as of 1971 major
- exportingfirms still relied heavily on domestic sales. When the exporting
experience becomes longer, and more differentiated from domestic sales,
greater possibilities for exploring contrasts in behavior between exporting and
import-substituting firms may become possible.
TRADE POLICIES, INCOME DISTRIBUTION,
AND EMPLOYMENT
The use of one policy instrument or a cluster of closely related ones may bring
a community closer to achieving several policy targets simultaneously. Such
happy circumstances, however, are rare. In the recent upsurge of export
1 optimism in Colombia as well as in other developing countries, there has been
a tendency to suppose that switching from policies emphasizing import substi-
- tutionto those giving greater incentives to exports will not only promote
efficiency and growth, but will also significantly improve income distribution
and accelerate the growth of employment in modern (or "truly productive")
activities. This supposition is usually based not just on the observation that
important control mechanisms associated with import substitution dispropor-
tionately benefit the powerful and the rich, but it also rests on appeals to a two-
factor version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. For developing countries
the latter emphasizes plentiful labor and scarce capital with or without down-
ward wage rigidity. How much of an improvement iii income distribution or
- employmentcan be expected from export-promoting policies, however, is
r usually not specified.
In earlier chapters, I argued that Colombian import controls and the
I protective system in general do appear to reinforce income inequality,
regional disparities, and industrial concentration. The protective system has
also encouraged a large number of capital-intensive projects. A policy package
•f that eliminates import controls while encouraging exports could, however,
f generate new rents even as it destroys those associated with import substitu-
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tion. Furthermore, the elimination of import controls would still leave a
multitude of similar mechanisms through which the rich and powerful could
take advantage of state power to buttress and further their position.25 Imper-
fections in domestic capital markets, to give one fashionable example, are as
large a source of inequality as import controls. Thus, focusing just on the
protective system can give a misleading impression of the true sources of
inequality, confusing a symptom for the cause of the disease, which, as noted
by many Colombians, lies in the excessive economic and political power held
by privileged minorities. It is debatable whether the economic and political
power suchminorities may lose from the abolition of import controls is greater
that the power gains that would accrue to, say, cattle, cotton, and sugar
landowners from their expanding exports.
In earlier chapters, evidence was presented on the characteristics of the
new Colombian minor exports. Such limited data suggest that, at the very
least, one would want to expand the usual two-by-two Heckscher-Ohlin trade
model to a three-by-three one to analyze the impact of trade policies on
income distribution and employment. On the input side, land or natural
resources must be added to labor and capital, while nontradable goods (or the
subsistence sector) must be added to importables and exportables. In the
expanded model, applications of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem will become
more difficult and ad hoc. But more fundamentally, it was seen earlier that the
emerging trade pattern of Colombia cannot be explained only by a simple or
expanded Heckscher-Ohlin model. Some "unusual" trade flows can be
explained by reference to domestic policies, for example, Colombian trade
with other members of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA).
In addition, other trade theories, such as vent-for-surplus, the product cycle,
and those emphasizing location, are helpful in explaining particular aspects of
Colombian foreign trade. In the literature, there is no systematic exploration,
either theoretical or empirical, of the implications of those positive trade
theories for functional income distribution, much less for family income
distribution or for the income of the poorest half of the population.
If a given export expansion can be explained by a vent-for-surplus model,
the name of the distributional game will be pure rents. Who gets them depends
on who owns the rent-yielding assets. If such assets are relatively homogene-
t ousand compact in location, they can be grouped under one label, "land,"
and a Heckscher-Ohlin model could be good enough to explore links between
trade and distribution, as in the Argentine case. In Colombia, these assets are
less homogeneous, ranging from sugar land in the Cauca Valley to mineral
deposits scattered over the whole country. One crop or mineral may be a
heavy user of labor inputs, but others may not, depending on the technological
characteristics of the production functions of the different staples, and the
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dollar prices of minor rural exports has highlighted one Argentine-like way of
viewing a mechanism linking greater openness of the economy with a worsen-
- ingof income distribution: as land prices rose because of the boom in those
exportable goods, the prices of foodstuffs grown for domestic consumption,
using somewhat similar land, also rose—in many cases ahead of money
f wages.
For exports of manufactured products the product cycle theory empha-
sizes the technological status of a commodity, i.e., whether it is new or old and
j standardized.Whether it is labor- or capital-intensive is of secondary impor-
r tance. The cement exported from the Colombian Atlantic coast, for example,
-r is a standardized good, benefiting in that case also from locational advantages;
its capital intensity is not a major barrier to its competing in the Caribbean
e area. Flat glass is exported from MedellIn, in spite of both capital intensity and
locational disadvantages.
A switch, speaking in relative terms, from import substitution to export
• promotion could improve income distribution in countries such as Colombia
• I or could worsen it. And the change attributable to trade policies could be
quantitatively important or negligible. No simple model could give us answers
to these alternatives, and the detailed information needed for confident projec-
• tions is not available.
Much the same can be said regarding the possible impact on employment,
r although there is reason to be more optimistic here, at least for the urban
sector. While the link between trade policies and income distribution has
much to do with the structures of the import-competing versus exporting
sectors, and relatively little to do with the over-all growth rate, it may be
conjectured that the opposite is likely to be the case for urban employment.
r Theimpact of different growth rates on income distribution, ceteris paribus, is
ambiguous, but is almost surely positive for urban employment. Even if it is
feared that import liberalization may destroy labor-intensive handicrafts with-
out generating a compensating expansion in labor-intensive exports, a higher
GNP growth rate made possible by the relaxation of the foreign-exchange
bottleneck is likely to have a net positive impact on urban employment
creation. Over the longer run, of course, this could feed back positively on
income distribution. The picture for rural employment is more complex, and
much depends on what incentives are generated for changes in land tenure,
I andon the robustness of the subsistence sector.
To clarify these uncertainties it would be helpful to have for marginal
• import-competing and exporting activities direct and indirect input require-
I mentsof such things as natural resources, unskilled and other labor, imported
• I machinery and equipment, and other capital goods. Disaggregation of activi-
ties would clearly have to go beyond that available in the Colombian input-
output table, which has one row and column for the whole rural sector. It
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might then be possible to compare, for example, the direct and indirect factor
use of refined sugar with that of "refined cotton," i.e., textiles, which now are
excessively dichotomized as exports of primary products versus exports of
manufactures.
But even at the level of first-round or direct effects, additional informa-
tion of a kind not found even in fairly disaggregated input-output tables seems
necessary to predict factor use. Factor proportions in a given Colombian
industry appear to differ markedly by firm size. It thus becomes important to
know whether large or small firms are carrying out marginal import substitu-
tion or exportation. It is also relevant to investigate whether, as seems likely
on average, large firms participate more in tradable goods sectors (both
exportables and importables) than in the sector producing nontradable goods
and services. Some idea of the variability in factor use according to size of firm
in the Colombian manufacturing sector is given in Table 8-9, on the assump-
tion that differences in average labor productivity reflect, at least partly,
differences in factor use. In this table it is indicated, for example, that the
variation in average productivity of firms employing between 50 and 100
persons in all the standard industrial classifications is not so different from the
variation in average labor productivity of firms producing paper and paper
products but differing among themselves in size.It is suggested that the
information gained about factor use from knowing that a given firm produces
tobacco or rubber products is useful but limited unless size of firm also is
specified. How much of this variability is due to heterogeneous output under
the standard industrial classifications and how much is due to differences in
factor use in the production of "identical" goods is another moot point, given
available data. Only finer disaggregation according to both output and size can
settle that issue. Similar considerations could be made regarding the rural
sector, for which Albert Berry has documented substantial differences in land
productivity according to farm size. Important distinctions in factor use and
technology exist especially between small subsistence farms and large corn-
mercial ones producing the same crop.26
Colombia has made great strides since World War II in expanding its
internal transport network. The abrupt geography of the country, however,
still segments domestic markets for goods and services. Ideally, then, the
consequences of export expansion or import substitution for regional factor
markets and internal migration should be examined, a task not feasible with
available data.
During a period of transition from policies emphasizing import substitu-
tion to those promoting exports, as 1967—72 undoubtedly was, most exporting
firms also sold substantially, and predominantly, to the domestic market. As
late as 1973, a group of large firms accounting for 42 per cent of registered
manufactured exports of that year were reported to have sold 90.8 per cent ofTABLE 8-9
Value Added per Employed Person in Colombian Manufacturing, 1967
Coeff. of No. of
VariationIndustries
Average (col. 2 or Firm
(thous. Stand. div. by Categories
1967 pesos)Dev. col. 1) Included
(1) (2) (3) (4)
According to size of firm (no. of persons):
1—14 29.1 18.4 0.63 25
15—19 38.1 47.7 1.25 24
20—49 42.1 34.6 0.82 25
50—99 47.0 28.1 0.60 25
100—199 64.6 48.5 0.75 25
200 and over 81.3 79.3 0.98 24
All manufacturing (average and
deviation across 25 industrial
classifications) 63.0 58.6 0.93 25
According to industrial classification:
Food 59.6 18.1 0,30 6
Beverages 94.8 58.4 0.62 6
Tobacco products 91.0 132.8 1.46 6
Textiles 32.5 8.6 0.26 6
Clothing and footwear 22.9 6.1 0.27 6
Printing and publishing 35.3 16.1 0.46 6
Pharmaceuticals and related products 68.9 33.1 0.48 6
Furniture and fixtures 19.6 6.1 0.31 6
Rubber products 75.6 88.7 1.17 6
Ceramic products 17.5 6.2 0.35 6
4"
Nonelectricalappliances 28.9 10.0 0.35 5
Electrical appliances 44.2 11.9 0.27 6
Motor vehicles 37.2 25.0 0.67 6
Wood and products 23.5 6.6 0.28 6
Paper and products 50.6 25.2 0.50 6
Leather and products 34.2 15.7 0.46 6
Chemicals other than
pharmaceuticals 88.2 34.0 0.39 6
Petroleum and coal products 158.7 98.7 0.62 5 (.
Nonmetallicmineral products 31.2 15.8 0.51 6
Basic metal products 77.2 22.5 0.29 6
Metal products 33.7 13.4 0.40 6
Mechanical machinery 30.6 6.1 0.20 6
Electrical machinery except
appliances 43.6 20.6 0.47 6
Transport equipment 30.3 8.1 0.27 6
Other 40.8 11.6 0.28 6
All manufacturing (average and
deviation across 6 firm-size
categories) 46.3 20.1 0.43 6
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Notes to Table 8-9
SOURCE: Basicdata obtained from IBRD, EconomicGrowth of Colombia: Problems and
Prospects, November 1, 1970, vol. IV, App. 1, Table II. This is the complete document on which
the World Bank publication listed in Table 8-3was based. Itshouldbe noted that the averages
shownfor each firm-size or industrial category are the unweighted averages obtained from the
relevant subgroups, which already involve some averaging. Thus, they can be expected to differ
from the (more exact) averages shown in Table 8-3. The first line of this table, for example, was
computed as follows: Using the average value added per employee of firms having 1 through 14
employees in each of the 25 industrial categories, the average for all industrial firms of that size
(29.1) was obtained, and its standard deviation (18.4) computed. For all manufacturing in the
seventh row ofthetable, averages for the value added per employee in each of the 25 industrial
categories (including all sizes of firms within that category) were used in the same fashion.
their output in the domestic market.27 Many of these firms used underutilized
capacity to produce exports. Thus, a given export expansion may have a
widely varying first-round impact on factor use depending on whether atten-
tion is directed to the short run or the long, and depending also on what
assumptions are made about firm behavior. Putting to use excess installed
capacity for sales abroad could involve a marginal capital use per unit of
output much lower in the short run than in the long. Contrary to what is likely
to happen in import substitution, new smaller firms may plunge into exporting
as the export drive becomes consolidated, once the larger firms have shown
that Colombian output can compete internationally and establish an export
infrastructure. Or smaller firms may become associated with larger export
firms in increasing numbers as subcontractors, an evolution that has also
occurred in the import-competing sector. In short, the factor use observed
during the early stages of an export drive may be significantly different from
that observed at more mature stages of export expansion, in a pattern different
from that observed during corresponding stages of an import substitution drive.
The calculation of indirect effects on factor demands and other general
equilibrium effects are also difficult accurately to trace out. The complemen-
tary or indirect services required by different types of export and import-
substituting activities could vary substantially. For example, the export of a
staple like coal will need complementary capital-intensive services, such as
transportation by railroads or trucks to take the product to harbors, quite
different from the needs of carnation exports or those generated in duty-free
zones.
As was noted in Chapter 1, Berry and Urrutia have shown that as of the
mid-1960s the distribution of Colombian personal income was highly unequal;
in their calculations for 1964, the Gini coefficient was Furthermore,
they find that a period of worsening distribution began in the 1930s and
continued until around the mid-1950s, not only over-all but in both urban and
rural sectors. From the mid-1950s until the mid-1960s, the evidence theyTRADE POLICIES, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT
TABLE 8-10
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1950—54 35.9 29.2 73.5 18.3 36.4 35.9
1955—58 31.3 33.5 71.9 18.3 36.9 35.7
1959—62 32.1 35.6 71.8 18.6 44.0 37.4
1963—66 33.2 37.6 74.4 18.3 47.8 39.3
1967—70 30.9 40.2 79.4 21.0 45.3 40.4
1971—72 27.6 40.7 77.3 17.1 47.0 40.1
SouRce: BdIR-CN. Percentages were computed using data at current prices and measured at factor cost.
examinedsuggests a moderate over-all improvement and an improvement in
urban distribution but a continued worsening of the distribution in agriculture.
They add that there is some tentative evidence that the latest episode of fast
growth, between 1967 and 1973, may have been characterized by a deteriora-
tion in the position of the urban employed worker, although the exact causes
for such deterioration are unclear. Some of this effect may have been compen-
sated for by a decrease in unemployment, however. They conclude that the
challenge now facing Colombia is in avoiding an increase in inequality in the
future as economic growth accelerates.
Changes in the labor share of GDP provide a crude, but available, index
of recent changes in income distribution. It may be seen in Table 8-10 that in
1971—72, by which time the post-1967 policies had become well established,
there was either an end or a reversal of the upward trend in the manufacturing
and over-all wage shares that had started after 1955—58. The plunge in the
rural wage share suggests that the new commercial crops use less labor than
the old staple, coffee, or the subsistence sector. By 1972, the wage share was
26.5percent in agriculture and livestock, 40.2 per cent in manufacturing, and
39.4 per cent for the whole GDP.
Scattered evidence29 suggests that open unemployment rates in the four
largest Colombian cities peaked in 1967, and have been declining ever since.
As in other developing countries, however, the openly unemployed in Colom-
bia are typically young people, nonheads of families, and others who can
afford to be in that situation. Those at the bottom of the income scale usually
have some kind of employment, and there is no evidence on whether demand
for their services has expanded substantially since 1967.
Both a priori considerations and available post-1967 evidence cast doubt
on the power of further import liberalization by itself significantly to alter
Colombian income distribution and employment patterns. It is particularly
I
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doubtful that further import liberalization would do much for or against those
in the bottom half of the income scale, say, during the next ten years or so.
Indeed, it is conceivable that continued encouragement of modern mecha-
nized rural activities oriented toward foreign markets could further damage
the prospects of landless farmers and minifundistas for obtaining family-sized
farms. It should be recalled that about 45 per cent of the Colombian active
population isstill engaged in rural activities and that a good share of the
poorest part of the nation is to be found there. Unless other policies are
adopted, the encouragement of commercial, export-oriented farming could
worsen land and income distribution in the countryside, and by absorbing
parts of the subsistence sector, it could actually generate disguised rural or
urban unemployment. It would not be the first time in history that such a thing
has happened.
TRADE AND FINANCIAL POLICIES
AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY
While income distribution and employment data are scarce, at least the
concepts involved are in principle quantifiable. "National autonomy" is a
vaguer concept, but of no less importance to those responsible for framing
international trade and financial policies in Colombia and elsewhere. As
measured by the proportion of imports of goods and services in GDP, the
openness of the Colombian economy rose from 13.0 per cent during 1963—66,
to 14.0 per cent during 1967—70, and to 15.6 per cent in Has this
trend been accompanied by a significant change in the degree of control of
Colombians over their own economy? What will be the impact of further
liberalization and openness on such control?
The post-1967 expansion has been characterized not only by a remarkable
diversification in the goods exported, but also by a continuing diversification
of geographical trade partners, visible also in imports. The extent of the
geographical diversification may be seen in tables 3-8 and 4-10. It was also
noted earlier, in chapters 2 and 6, that the participation of foreign-owned
enterprises in minor exports, while important, particularly for manufactured
products, is less than that of domestic firms, and probably less than the
participation of foreign firms in the most dynamic import-substituting activi-
ties. It would indeed be dangerous for the political viability of export promo-
tion if the production or merchandising of new exports fell predominantly
under the control of foreign enterprise. Dissatisfaction with protectionist
policies was boosted as a greater share of those firms most critical to the
success of import substitution turned out to be foreign owned.
Vulnerability to external cycles and pressures has been reduced not onlyTRADE AND FINANCIAL POLICIES AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY247
by geographical and product diversification, but also by the establishment of
preferential arrangements with middle-income countries at a similar stage of
industrialization. The Andean Common Market may be viewed partly as
insurance against a collapse of world markets. if such an event occurs, import
substitution at the Andean level could go into high gear partly to offset the
collapse of export drives. Had Latin America had such arrangements in 1929,
the industrialization of the 1930s and 1940s would in all likelihood have been
faster and more efficient. Andean and wider Latin American integration
schemes also afford some insurance against possible commercial and financial
blockades and could facilitate access to specific raw materials. Ecuador and
Venezuela, both Colombian neighbors and members of the Andean group, are
blessed by ample oil deposits, while other Andean partners have rich stores of
minerals.
Year-to-year percentage changes in total export dollar earnings for 1968—
72 compared with 1963—67 already show not only a higher average growth rate
(8.19 per cent versus 2.42 per cent) but also a lower average absolute deviation
from the mean of the more recent period (5.97 per cent versus 8.11 per cent).
Trade is only one aspect of Colombian links with the international
economy, and trade liberalization will typically be accompanied by larger
gross flows of capital as well as special services, such as technology. A case
can be made that international markets for technology and capital are less
diversified and competitive than those for most goods, thus posing a potential
threat to the autonomy of countries relying too heavily on them without
defensive mechanisms. Such mechanisms, of course, can also be used to
obtain better bargains. For these reasons, Colombian authorities are likely to
retain present controls and registration procedures for transfer of technology
and capital flows, particularly direct foreign investments, even if they elimi-
nate import controls. In some cases the greater competitive pressures put on
import-competing firms, many of them foreign owned, by the elimination of
import controls, plus realistic exchange rates, will reduce the importance of
keeping detailed tabs on such matters as overinvoicing of imported inputs and
fake royalty payments abroad. This should make for greater efficiency of
controls over transactions involving monopoly power originating abroad,
rather than wasting effort dealing with monopoly power created by misguided
domestic protectionism.
The presence of both capital and technological inflows raises the possibil-
ity of excessive reliance on foreigners. The effect could be to weaken local
efforts and reduce the capability of Colombia for long-run autonomous devel-
opment. The flabby performance of recent Colombian private and public
savings, at a time of fast growth and substantial capital inflow, documented
earlier in this chapter, suggests that such a concern may not be misplaced,
even if it is difficult to say much more on the subject for a single country.248 TRADE POLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
More, however, can be said on different types of capital flows. Non-
concessional long-term capital is now available to Colombia mainly in two
forms: as direct foreign investment (DFI) and as sales abroad of Colombian
debt. The former type, as is well known, comes as a package of technology,
management, marketing, and capital. The same Decree Law 444of1967 that
consolidated the framework for a crawling peg and export promotion also
established firm controls over DFI, later reflected in the celebrated Resolution
24 of the Andean group. The fears of the international financial press notwith-
standing, DFI has continued flowing into Colombia. Indeed, and somewhat
disappointingly, the allocation pattern of such investment since 1967 has been
about what it was It may be seen in Table 8-li that chemicals,
refineries, rubber, and plastics, heavily toward import substitution,
have continued attracting about one-third of DFI. The same source given in
that table indicates little change in the geographical origins of DFI: the United
States still accounts for about half, with the shares for Switzerland, France,
Japan, and the Federal Republic of Germany showing an increase after
As with other semi-industrialized or resource-rich developing countries,
Colombia discovered during the early 1970s that it could obtain substantial
sums from 'harm's length" world capital markets. During 1973, for example,
Colombia was reported to have borrowed $170 million in the Eurocurrency
market.32 This source of funds, although expensive, provides a healthy alter-
native to both DFI and the more traditional forms of borrowing from multilat-
eral intermediaries, such as the IBRD and the IADB, as well as to conces-
sional bilateral finance. Borrowing from either the Eurocurrency market or
other foreign capital markets carries costs and risks not associated with
borrowing from the IBRD and the IADB, but could involve less sacrifice of
national control over investment decisions.33 As with any form of foreign
borrowing, of course, it bears careful controlling, both at the level of individ-
ual loans and in the aggregate.
As measured by the traditional indicators, e.g., service payments on the
whole external public debt as a percentage of exports of goods and nonfactor
services, the Colombian debt burden remains moderate. It stood at 15.5 per
cent in 1965—66, at 12.7 per cent in 1967—70, and at 13.5 per cent in
So long as exports maintain their dynamism, the Colombian capacity to
borrow in private markets should be quite'good, potentially strengthening the
position of the country vis-à-vis multilateral intermediaries and bilateral
donors.
On the whole, it is doubtful that the gradual post-1967 liberalization trend
has substantially changed Colombia's capacity for autonomous decision mak-
ing; on balance, the net change seems to be, if anything, toward greater
effective national control over the domestic economy. Aided also by trends inTRADE AND FINANCIAL POLICIES AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY249
TABLE 8-11
Structure of Accumulated Direct Foreign Investment in Colombia
(per cent of total)
Accumulated
Investment
As of from January 1,
January 1, 1967, Through
1967 December 31, 1972
Foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco 6.8 3.7
Textiles, clothing, and leather products 4.0 3.8
Wood products and furniture 0.3 4.1
Paper, printing, and publishing 8.9 2.7
Chemicals, refineries, rubber, and plastics 31.8 33.3
Nonmetallic minerals 5.1 2.6
Basic metals 1.6 1.2
Metal products, machinery, and equipment 11.3 12.7
Other manufacturing 0.6 0.4
All manufacturing 70.3 64.4
Finance, insurance, real estate, and related
services 11.4 24.4
Commerce, hotels, and restaurants 11.4 6.5
Mining (except petroleum) 2.7 1.4
Transport and communications 2.4 0.8
Agriculture, livestock, and fishing 0.9 0.9
All other 0.8 1.6 4
Total 100.0 100.0
Total value, millions of U.S. dollars $429.1 $111.0
SOURCE: BdIR-IAGJD, 1972, p. 122. Data refer to the registered and accumulated value of
investments except those in petroleum. Registered value underestimates the value of assets owned
and controlled by foreign investors.
the world economy, policymakers are able to consider more options than they
could have realistically faced, say, around 1965. On the other hand, the
greater openness of the economy demands a more careful coordination of
different policy tools, such as monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policies,
than was necessary when both Colombia and the Atlantic world had less
complex and interrelated economies, as during the 1950s.250 TRADE POLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
SOME FINAL REMARKS
The gradualist trade and payments policies followed since 1967 have impres-
sive achievements to their credit. By placing balance-of-payments manage-
ment on a routine basis, they permitted a more efficient and faster over-all
growth rate, which appeared out of reach during 1957—66. A remarkable
expansion of exports, aided by a booming world economy, confounded export
pessimists. The improved balance-of-payments and growth performance also
defied gloomy predictions about the unique post-1967 Colombian approach to
liberalization made by perspicacious foreign observers as late as As
noted by several Colombian analysts, the relaxation of the foreign-exchange
bottleneck and the removal of periodic exchange crises from the front pages
have given policymakers the option of turning their attention to the really
serious problems in the Colombian economy—poverty, underemployment,
income distribution, and national autonomy—areas in which the impact of
trade and payments policies is indirect and weak or uncertain.
Further import liberalization, beyond the stage reached in mid-1974, and
a reorganizing of the export promotion system could, if properly managed,
and with the right world market conditions, consolidate and expand the post-
1967 gains in efficiency and growth. But a good case can be made that other
reforms, complementing those in the area of foreign trade and payments, are
likely now to have a larger payoff, particularly in the area of income distribu-
tion. These would include a profound tax reform, involving stiffer land taxes,
expansion of public expenditures in education and health, and a liberalization
of the domestic capital market, either by giving a greater role to market-
influenced interest rates or by lending and borrowing policies of a nationalized
banking and financial system that imitated ideal competitive solutions. The
relaxation of the foreign-exchange constraint has focused attention once again
on the need to expand local (private and public) savings if the over-all growth
rate is to be increased, or even maintained, since the marginal capital-output
ratio registered in recent years is unlikely to persist. A less distorted internal
capital market may help somewhat in this area. 3
Whileavoidable balance-of-payments crises have not distracted policy-
makers in recent years, a similar superficial issue has re-emerged, especially in
1973 and 1974. During those years overly expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies, including financial reforms boosting construction, led to an overheat-
ing of the economy which, coupled with exogenous increases in the world
dollar price level, resulted in severe inflation. Among other things, such
inflation has endangered the crawling peg policy, undertaken since 1967
amidst declining inflationaryrates. The policymaker,inparticular the
new reformist administration inaugurated August 1974, is forced to give first
priority to a macroeconomic management issue which lacks positive long-runt4OTES 251
structuraleffects but which if left unattended could have negative conse-
quences. In some respects the anti-inflation struggle should accelerate the
- trendtoward more efficient trade policies, as in the case of the dismantling of
- importcontrols. However, such a struggle also encourages export controls, so
that even as the old prohibited and prior-license import lists disappear or
shrink, similar ones appear on the export side. And the temptation remains to
t slow down the crawling peg as a way of fighting inflation.
) In retrospect, the Colombian experience vindicates the case for gradual-
) ism in import liberalization which went pan passu with export expansion. It
Is was not necessary to dismantle the protective system before that export
expansion could be generated. The wisdom of avoiding shock treatments
s while keeping control over macroeconomic management policies remains
relevant for anti-inflationary policies.
Even as Colombian policymaking has gained in sophistication, trends in
f the world economy have imposed upon it the need for further improvement,
particularly in the areas of macroeconomic and balance-of-payment manage-
ment. As Colombian links with world trade and financial markets multiply, for
example, problems long familiar to policymakers of industrialized countries,
- suchas the coordination of monetary and foreign-exchange policies, will claim
r greater attention from Colombian authorities. The Colombian crawling peg
during most of 1967—74 was basically used to eliminate wide divergences
- betweenlocal and external inflation; expectations about the pace of the crawl
were fairly stable and on the whole were confirmed by actual experience.
Under these circumstances the crawling peg has not performed the isolating
- rolea more freely fluctuating rate is supposed to achieve. Therefore, domestic
monetary policy cannot have the autonomy it could have under a truly flexible
rate system. Furthermore, the confused and disturbed state of the world
I economy during 1974 indicates that Colombian exchange-rate policy will have
1 to deal not only with disturbances originating inside the country, but also with
those issuing from an increasingly erratic world market.
It would therefore be a mistake to interpret import liberalization and
rationalization of the system of protection as a retreat from planning in the
- foreignsector. Such steps in fact are a part of the search for a more efficient
I planningof international trade and finance policies.
NOTES
1. These rates of growth or decline are obtained by fitting trend lines, as in tables 1-1 and 1-2.
2. In Table 1-2, GDP growth rates are shown only for 1950—56 and 1967—72. Preliminary
statistics indicate a GDP growth rate of 7.0 per cent for 1973. See CoyunturaEcondmica, April
1974, p. 5. UNECLA estimates place the GDP annual growth rate at 5.2 per cent during 1945—50252 TRADEPOLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
and at 4.2 per cent for just 1947—50.TheUNECLA estimates can be found in DANE-BME, no.
Th 226, May 1970.
3. See Richard Caves,'Export-led Growth and the New Economic History," in J. N. above,
Bhagwati et al., eds., Trade,Balance ofPaymentsand Growth: Papersin International Econom- fell sho
ics inHonorof Charles P. Kindleberger (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1971), especially pp. 419—
10.
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4. Trend growth rates and deviations somewhat different from those shown in tables 8-1 and
11. 8-2 are obtained when the dummy variable t2 for the six years 1967—72 is given values of 1,2 bia:
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in R. S. 7. The theoretical rationale for linking effective rates of protection to either import-substitu-
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and Industrialization in Nigeria: A Comment," Bangladesh Economic Review, forthcoming. Group" 8. Other case studies are reported in Daniel Vargas and Eduardo Wiesner, 'Las Exports-
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inflational labor-intensive exports selling at world prices and compares them with heavily protected activities
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contribution made to the gap in DRCs by differences in cost structure and guesses about shadow market,
input prices is usually quite small. has been 9. The 1962 Colombian development plan included export targets for 1970, which were
On
revised by the IBRD during 1962. Those projections, made in millions of current U.s. dollars, can granted
be compared with actual 1970 figures, as follows:
. UnitedSt4
Colombian IBRD Actual 1970 GATT-ar4
Plan Estimates Exports burden
on the Registered exports, total $827 $700 . $736
Coffee 405 340 467
Crude oil 167 167 59 stones. SI
governme Bananas 43 43 18
18. 1 Cotton 39 40 35 EERrelat Tobacco 15 for this w Sugar 1 173 5 15
ne&ects u Other 90 135
19. S Nonregistered exports 30 30 59
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IMEno. The projections are from IBRD, An Appraisal of the Development Program of Colombia,
Report WH-119a, June 21, 1962, Annex 1, pp. 5 and 11. Actual 1970 data are from Chapter 2,
in j.N. above. Actual registered minor exports in 1970 exceeded the IBRD projections by 9 per cent, but
Econo m- fell short of the ambitious targets of the development plan by 18 per Cent.
pp. 419— 10. See Francisco E. Thoumi, "Evolución de Ia Industna Manufacturera Fabril 1958—1967,"
DANE-BME, March 1971, p. 60.
8-I and 11. David Morawetz, "Import Substitution, Employment and Foreign Exchange in Colom-
1.2,. .. bia:No Cheers for Petrochemicals," mimeographed (Harvard Development Advisory Service,
for September 1972). Morawetz adds:'In Colombia petrochemicals received more government
imaybe finance and support than any other industrial sector in the 1960s. For example, in 1969 chemicals
and petrochemicals participated 40 percent in the portfolio of the largest government industrial
development agency (IFI) and received 25 percent of all credits and refinancings granted by the
government's Private Investment Fund (FL?), in spite of the fact that it generated only 8 percent of
industrial production and employment" (p. 1).
12. For an early analysis of this industry see Bernard E. Munk, "The Colombian Automotive
Industry: The Welfare Consequences of Import Substitution," mimeographed (AID, August
1968). In that paper Munk was pessimistic about cost refiuctions in this industry even assuming
Andean integration.
13. Speculative holdings of importable-goods inventories were emphasized by Alberto Roque
Musalem, but from a balance-of-payments and macroeconomic perspective. See his Dinero,
InflaciónBalanza de Pagos: La Experiencia de Colombia en Ia Post-Guerra (Bogota: Talleres
Gráflcos del Banco de Ia RepUblica, 1971), particularly Chapter 1.
14. See Francisco E. Thoumi, "The Utilization of Fixed Industrial Capital in Colombia:
s.D. diss.. Some Empirical Findings," mimeographed (IBRD, December 1973).
15. See Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, "The Andean Common Market: Gestation and Outlook,"
in R. S. Eckaus and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, eds., Analysis of Development Problems: Studies of
rt-substitu- the Chilean Econotny (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973), pp. 293—326. See also David Morawetz,
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oming. Group" (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972).
s Exporta- 16. Current tax revenues of the national government reached 9.8 per cent of GD? in 1970, but
EDESAR fell to approximately 9.0 per cent by 1973, contributing to a large fiscal deficit and a deteriorating,
starts with inflationary situation during 1973 and 1974. See Coyuntura Econdmica, April 1974, p. 124 and pp. t
dactivitieS 133—134.
The further 17. During 1974 the U.S. Treasury charged Colombia with "dumping" carnations in the U.S.
)ut shadow market, giving as evidence the CAT received by those exporters. It will be recalled that the CAT
has been in effect since 1967; its creation was widely celebrated by U.S. AID officials.
were On September 26, 1974, the Colombian government announced a sharp reduction in the CATs
Jollars. can granted to exporters. Among the reasons given for such a move was the recent imposition by the
United States of countervailing duties on some Colombian exports. Colombia also announced that
1970 GATt-approved exemptions from sales taxes would now be granted to exporters. As sales taxes
rts burden luxury goods more than necessities, it was argued that such a step would reduce pressure
• on the cost of living of the poorest Colombians. The government also argued that a high CAT was
stimulating fake export invoicing, notably on clothing and on emeralds, rubies, and other precious
-9
stones. Skinning the CAT is expected to increase public revenues by about P900 million. The
8
government indicated that it expects eventually to lift all export prohibitions.
18. The best proxy for the price ratio of tradable goods to nontradables may be an average
7
EER relative to Colombian wages for unskilled labor deflated by comparable wages abroad. Data
15 for this were not available for the whole period under study. Even this measure, of course,
neglects to take into account changes in the terms of trade.
59 19. Such a base was taken in Dla.z-Alejandro, "Andean Common Market," p. 326.
20. National accounting procedures may overemphasize somewhat the link between the real254 TRADEPOLICIES AND COLOMBIAN DEVELOPMENT
import exchange rate and the relative prices of machinery and equipment by neglecting to account
fully for changes in import premiums at times of balance-of-payments turbulence. Changes in
import duties on capital goods, however, have been small. It will also be recalled that major
industrial corporations import their machinery and equipment directly.
21. See Carlos F. DIaz-Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic
(New Haven; Yale University Press, 1970), especially Essay 6. For a long time 1950 was the base
year for Argentine national accounts expressed in constant prices. In that year, relative prices of
all Argentine investment goods reached a peak, as did Colombian ones in 1958. Researchers using
Argentine and Colombian constant-price data for cross-country comparisons have therefore
frequently marveled at the high investment coefficients and extraordinary marginal capital-output
ratios of the two countries. Contrary to the Argentine experience,. Colombian implicit prices for
the two major commodity-producing sectors have evolved comparatively undramatically relative
to the GNP deflator, as follows (1958 =100);
Agriculture and Agriculture and
Lives rock Manufacturing Livestock Manufacturing
1950—54 99.0 109.3 1963—66 96.9 106.0
1955—56 104.3 103.5 1967—70 94.3 97.6
1957—58 102.7 101.0 1971—72 95.5 97.2
1959—62 96.2 103.6
22. Some model builders have speculated about such an elasticity. See W. M. Corden, "The
Effects of Trade onRate of Growth," in Bhagwati et al, eds., Trade, Chap. 6, especially pp.
126—131.
23. Without the rise in minor and coffee exports it is doubtful whether Colombia could have
expanded its foreign debt and attracted other types of capital to the extent realized since 1967.
24. Leonard Dudley, "The Effects of Learning on Employment and Productivity in the
Colombian Metal Products Sector," mimeographed (University of Montreal, September 1973).
25. The statement stands, of course, whether the country is developed or underdeveloped.
Without import controls (but with milk subsidies!), the 1973—74 Watergate matter in the United
States showed some of the many channels through which private interests can manipulate state
power. The Matesa scandal in Spain was in fact related to export-promotion schemes.
26. See R. Albert Berry, "Land Distribution, Income Distribution and Productivity," Chap-
ter IV of a forthcoming Yale Economic Growth Center book on the Colombian rural sector. Berry
indicates that the labor-land ratio may vary by as much as five to ten times between the two ends
of the technology spectrum, a range associated with size of farms, in a crop such as corn.
27. See FEDESARROLLO, Encuesta Industrial, June 1974, pp. 7—8. In 1972 these firms had
sold 92.7 per cent of their output domestically.
28. R. Albert Berry and Miguel Urrutia, Income Distribution in Colombia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, forthcoming), Chap. 12.
29. Here 1 follow (again!) unpublished estimates of R. Albert Berry, as well as FEDESAR-
t ROLLO,Coyuntura Económica, various issues.
30. Both imports of goods and services and GDP (at market prices) are measured at current
prices. The percentages will thus reflect changes in the relation between the average import
exchange rate and the GDP deflator. For earlier years, the corresponding percentages are as
follows: 1950—54, 12.9; 1955—56, 13.5; 1957—58, 14.8; and 1959—62, 14.3.
31. A good share of the registered DFI gives as its home base countries such as Panama,
Curaçao, the Bahamas, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein, making further precision as to geograph-
ical origins spurious. Some of these countries, incidentally, are also notorious smuggling centers.
It appears that Colombia was hurt more by having stalled on the enforcement of Andean rules than
if the country had acted at once. The debate over the constitutionality of Andean rules during 1972NOTES 255
seemsto have led to a slowdown in DFI inflow. But once Decision 24 was firmly in place, DFI
picked up vigorously. See Business Latin America, September 25, 1974, p. 310.
32. See IMFSun'ey, June 3, 1974, p. 165.
r 33. In the articles listed below, I have argued the thesis that DFI, particularly in the form it
took during the 1950s and 1960s, is an unsatisfactory mechanism for promoting international
interdependence: 'Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed.,
The International Corporation; A Symposium (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1970), pp. 319—344;
"The Future of Direct Foreign Investment in Latin America," in Stephen E. Guisinger, ed.,
Trade and Investment Policies in the Americas (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press,
1973), Pp. 3—28; and "North-South Relations: The Economic Component," International Organi-
zation, Winter 1975, pp. 213—241. As they gain in bargaining power, one may expect countries
r such as Colombia and Mexico to tie their regulations over DFI to the treatment received by their
emigrating labor (or their labor-intensive exports) in the home countries of foreign investors.
34. As reported in World Bank/IDA, Annual Report, 1974, p. 87. The corresponding 1972
percentages were 22.2 for Argentina, 13.4 for Brazil, and 23.5 for Mexico.
35. See chapters 7 and 8 in Richard R. Nelson, T. Paul Schultz, and Robert L. Slighton,
Structural Change in a Developing Economy; Colombia's Problems and Prospects (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). Although their study was published during 1971, back-
ground research was carried out mainly during the difficult years of 1967 and 1968. Nelson and
Slighton, who themselves called my attention to the pessimism of the indicated chapters, consider
that they underestimated the influence of the younger Colombian economists and the rapidity with
which an export lobby with political clout would be created.
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